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The Court's failure to recognize the culturally partial view of social reality that its conclusion embodies is symptomatic of a kind of cognitive bias that is endemic to legal and political decisionmaking and that needlessly magnifies cultural conflict over and discontent with the law.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the recent United States Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, commentators focused heavily on one comment that Sotomayor made at a number of lectures in the past. Sotomayor had said that she hoped that "a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life."
2 Although critics widely lambasted her for this statement, 3 and she herself later backed away from it to secure her nomination, 4 a kernel of truth nevertheless emerged from this confirmation proceeding skirmish; not that ideologically driven judging is inevitably part of the judging function, but rather that a judge cannot help but be influenced by his or her cultural background. So, although reasonable people might disagree that a female Latina judge "reach[es] a better conclusion" 5 than her white male counterpart "more often than not," 6 this Article maintains that a judge's cultural background does subconsciously have a very real impact on the outcome of legal decisions. Indeed, contrary to many commentators who have suggested that judging is generally an ideologically driven enterprise, 7 Dan Kahan, This Article contends that it is cultural cognition that provides a more robust explanation of how judicial values impact judicial decisions, and importantly, how disagreements come to exist between judges in particularly hotly contested cases or areas of the law. One such area of the law that is highly polarized is labor and employment law. From traditional union-management disputes to employment discrimination and employee benefit cases, the two sides of these workplace debates cannot even agree on the meaning of pertinent facts a lot of the time. And it is not just the parties that see the relevant facts differently, but also appellate judges reviewing these cases.
("The most difficult issues are resolved, [and] the principal empirical findings are clear. In many domains, Republican appointees vote very differently from Democratic appointees, and ideological tendencies are both dampened and amplified by the composition of the pan- [ideological voting] is the idea that judges and Justices simply vote their political preferences, so if you know whether they are Democrats or Republicans you can predict their decisions; a more refined version substitutes ideology for party affiliation.").
8. For a description of culture cognition theory and the various projects being studied by different scholars using this theory, see THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT Now, it is true that workplace cases can be viewed as largely partisan exercises in which conservative judges vote for employers or management and liberal ones vote in the opposite manner in favor of union or employee interests. Yet, however one defines "ideology," 12 the common ideological explanations for judges' behavior in workplace cases are inadequate. Culture cognition theory, for its part, suggests that judges are really disagreeing about legally consequential facts over which there is some speculation and uncertainty. In fact, such disagreements are especially prevalent in labor and employment cases where the factual issues that divide judges involve a large amount of speculation and inconclusive evidence about: employer and employee motivations, the proper measure for efficiency in both the public and private workplace, and the proper standard for technical or arcane measurements in the workplace (like technological feasibility in the OSHA context). 13 To illustrate this point, this Article analyzes two of the more controversial labor and employment decisions by the Supreme Court in the past two decades where a specifically illiberal form of judicial bias-cognitive illiberalism-is on display in the Justices' opinions. 14 12. Professor Kahan has explored at least three different ways in which legal scholars have discussed the manner in which judges' values impact their decisions: (1) values could supply a self-conscious partisan motivation for a decision; that is, "choosing the outcome that best promotes their political preferences without regard for the law"; (2) values could supply a self-conscious legal motivation for a decision in which there does not exist "a strict separation between moral reasoning and legal reasoning"; this might be referred to as culture as evaluation; or (3) values could help judges resolve certain disputed factual claims embedded in what they agree is the controlling standard; this third way, cultural cognition, maintains that values operate through a subconscious influence on cognition. See Dan M. Kahan, "Ideology In" or "Cultural Cognition of" Judging: What Difference Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 415-16 (2009) . Although I believe the first way is what many political scientists mean when they say that judicial decisions are all about politics or ideology, in reality I believe that the second way, where "[j]udges . . . resort to normative theories to connect abstract concepts like 'free speech' and 'equal protection' to particular cases," is closer to how ideology is thought to actually operate by most legal academic commentators studying attitudinal models. Id. at 415 (arguing that this type of ideology involves merely the sort of moral theorizing the law itself contemplates). Of course, this Article argues the third way best describes how judges' values impact their decisions.
13. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the entire purpose of the shifting burdens of proof applicable in employment discrimination cases "is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by"); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264-66 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per Skelly Wright, C.J.) (observing, in OSHA standardssetting context: "As for [proof of] technological feasibility, we know that we cannot require of OSHA anything like certainty. Since 'technology-forcing' assumes the agency will make highly speculative projections about future technology, a standard is obviously not infeasible solely because OSHA has no hard evidence to show that the standard has been met."); 
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CULTURAL COGNITION AT WORK 111 This distinction between viewing judges as subconsciously motivated by cultural preferences rather than by prejudicial partisan or legal objectives is a crucial one. First, if the form of bias in judicial decisionmaking is not properly understood, the judging function is unnecessarily delegitimized as being merely a partisan or normative exercise. Second, although it is impossible to rid judicial decisions of all remnants of bias because of the manner in which human cognition operates, 15 social science and legal research indicate that debiasing techniques do exist for judges to counteract their susceptibility to the more troubling and illiberal aspects of their biased decisionmaking. Such techniques include adopting appropriate judicial habits of mind and writing judicial decisions that consider the varying background values of impacted parties.
In all, then, this Article seeks to explore, for the first time, whether the theory of cultural cognition may provide a more complete explanation for how controversial labor and employment law issues are decided by judges with different worldviews. In the process, it also hopes to provide a roadmap for minimizing the amount of cognitive illiberalism in these highly contested types of cases. Part II outlines the general theory behind cultural cognition, including its social science roots, its more recent application to legal issues, and finally, its meaning for judicial decisionmaking. Part III then reviews two labor and employment law cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court to study how values appear to subconsciously influence judges' perception of legally consequential facts and consequently, their decisions in these cases. Part IV highlights the significance of appreciating these cases through a cultural cognition prism. Finally, Part V concludes by explaining how decisionmaker bias of this form may be counteracted through innovative social science and legal techniques. More specifically, judges could exercise judicial humility to guide courts away from unnecessary decisions that appear to embrace partisanship and delegitimize the concerns of a group of citizens who come out on the losing end in such cases. Alternatively, opinions written in an expressively overdetermined manner, capitalizing on ideas of individual self-affirmation, could provide a powerful tool in toning down the rhetoric and the overheated disagreements, which are all-too-frequent in many of today's judicial decisions.
15. Indeed, some forms of judicial bias in judicial opinions are desirable. Judges should generally evaluate situations in a way that embodies a stance toward phenomena in the world that accurately expresses what they (along with others who share their defining commitments) care about. In this Article, I am merely seeking to employ debiasing strategies on more regrettable forms of judicial decisionmaking bias in which judges exhibit "overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of the factual perceptions [they] hold in common with [their] confederates and unwarranted contempt for the perceptions associated with [their] opposites." Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 843. This type of bias has been labeled "cognitive illiberalism" and this paper looks for techniques to preempt it. Id.
II. A PRIMER ON THE THEORY OF CULTURAL COGNITION
Cultural cognition is a heuristic that comes to the legal academy from research conducted in the disciplines of anthropology and social psychology. 16 In a sentence, "[c]ultural cognition refers to a collection of psychological mechanisms that moor our perceptions of societal danger to our cultural values."
17 As a result, individuals gravitate toward factual beliefs which permit them to see worthwhile conduct as also socially beneficial conduct.
18 Moreover, to the extent that disagreement exists about the harmfulness of a particular form of conduct, individuals tend to trust those who share their values.
19
The first section of this Part explores the foundational roots of cultural cognition theory and the connection between cultural values and perceived societal risks. The second section then explains how cultural cognition theory applies to legal issues and controversies, with emphasis on a recent empirical study conducted by Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald Braman in the criminal procedure/civil rights context.
A. The Roots of Cultural Cognition Theory
The Anthropological Roots
Cultural cognition theory borrows heavily from well-known anthropological studies that explore the relationship between risk perception and cultural worldviews. 20 These worldviews "are the filters through which a person views the world-how it is and how it should be-they profoundly influence peoples' attitudes." 21 In one of her well- . See also Cultural Cognition Project, supra note 8 ("Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their beliefs about disputed matters of fact (e.g., whether global warming is a serious threat; whether the death penalty deters murder; whether gun control makes society more safe or less) to values that define their cultural identities.").
18. See Kahan, supra note 17, at 120 ("Whether we regard putatively harmful activities (deviant sexual practices, gun possession, nuclear power) with fear or admiration, with disgust or equanimity, with dread or indifference, expresses the cultural valuations we attach to those activities.").
19. 22 Under this framework, there are two basic worldviews: "the first concerns the relationship of the individual to the group (individualistic versus communitarian orientation); the second concerns the nature of society (hierarchical versus egalitarian)." 23 Kahan and Braman have aptly summarized one way of potentially understanding the meaning of these various cultural preferences for individuals' worldviews:
A "low group" worldview coheres with an individualistic social order, in which individuals are expected to secure their own needs without collective assistance, and in which individual interests enjoy immunity from regulation aimed at securing collective interests. A "high group" worldview, in contrast, supports a solidaristic or communitarian social order, in which collective needs trump individual initiative, and in which society is expected to secure the conditions of individual flourishing. A "high grid" worldview favors a hierarchical society, in which resources, opportunities, duties, rights, political offices and the like are distributed on the basis of conspicuous and largely fixed social characteristics-gender, race, class, lineage. A "low grid" worldview favors an egalitarian society, one that emphatically denies that social characteristics should matter in how resources, opportunities, duties and the like are distributed.
24
Consider how Douglas's cultural worldviews framework can be utilized to illuminate the nature of the political and legal disputes endemic to American labor and employment law. Prounion or proemployee rights individuals tend to be low grid/high group in orientation. 25 Such individuals embrace collectivist values such as solidarity with their fellow workers and are content to wield the power of the collective against employers even though they must generally put for an individual's interaction with her surroundings, including other people and society."). See also Grimmelmann, supra note 20, at 1161-62.
22 MEASURING CULTURE 6 (1985) ). Although cultural cognition does not require application of the grid-group framework, this framework does present one easily understandable method for measuring cultural conflict.
25. Though, to be fair, under another view, people who like unions could also be viewed as high group/high grid. This may be a generational distinction as historically unions believed in a society which distributed resources based on fixed characteristics like seniority. Unions may be more egalitarian today. See infra note 27.
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[Vol. 38:107 aside their individual wants and desires. 26 Many of these same individuals also tend to believe in egalitarianism and dislike any notion of a ruling, corporate upper class in America. 27 They support the expansion of constitutional equal protection doctrine and a robust reading of federal statutory rights under equal employment opportunity laws. 28 Finally, individuals with these values tend to believe that unsafe work conditions and the social inequality that results from unequal bargaining power justify labor regulations that level the proverbial playing field.
29
On the other side of this ledger, many proemployer types can be viewed as individuals who are high grid/low group in orientation. These individuals tend to embrace values such a liberty, market freedom, autonomy, and self-reliance. 30 In the workplace context, these individuals dislike legal regulations because they undermine their vision of how to run their businesses. 31 They also tend to believe that unions wrongly monopolize the labor market and that employers should not be overly constrained in running an efficient workplace. 29. The National Labor Relations Act embodies the type of regulation that low gridhigh group individuals favor. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) ("The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.").
30. In this regard, consider the recent "Tea Party" phenomenon. One Tea Party website describes its movement thusly: "Participants at Tea Party protests come from all over the spectrum of the ideological dial, but all share the small government, 'Don't Tread On Me' thinking that our Founders envisioned. 
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Anthropological worldviews, as developed by Douglas, thus may help explain how different populations have divergent factual perceptions about risk. Furthermore, the grid/group framework works well to illuminate the fundamental disagreements that separate union members from management and employees from employers.
The Social Psychological Roots
Whereas anthropology categorizes people's cultural identities based on worldviews, social psychology assists in explaining the mechanism by which individuals become attached to these worldviews. Specifically, social psychology posits that cultural values play a large role in helping people determine which state of affairs promote their interests. 33 Four overlapping social psychological mechanisms that assist in explaining individuals' attachment to different worldviews include: (1) cognitive-dissonance avoidance, (2) affect, (3) biased assimilation, and (4) group polarization. 34 The avoidance of cognitive dissonance refers to the way the mind tries to avoid conflict in facts or ideas-whatever those facts or ideas are-with preexisting beliefs. 35 So, we avoid cognitive dissonance by noting and assigning importance to instances of harm associated with conduct we dislike and by ignoring or minimalizing instances of harm associated with conduct we admire. 36 Applied to the workplace context, a prounion individual will tend to believe that employer intimidation of employees during a union organizing campaign is the most important conduct to regulate, while simultaneously dismissing or minimalizing union intimidation of these same employees during a cardcheck authorization procedure. An individual with a proemployer orientation would tend to believe the opposite with equal certainty. 37 33. Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 171 ("The phenomenon of cultural cognition refers to a series of interlocking social and psychological mechanisms that induce individuals to conform their factual beliefs about contested policies to their cultural evaluations of the activities subject to regulation.").
34. Affect deals with the role emotions play in shaping a person's perceptions. 38 Research has shown that individuals connect danger to activities that evoke emotions such as fear, anger, and disgust. 39 This heuristic occurs because individuals do not have access to the necessary information to form their own opinions about the issue. They therefore conform "their perceptions of risk to the visceral reactions that putatively dangerous activities evoke." 40 So, for example, some employers may see danger in unions because they associate unions with loss of profit and, perhaps, even dread mobsters infiltrating their businesses. 41 On the other hand, employees feel anger and dread when fellow employees are terminated in an arbitrary manner under an employment-at-will regime and thus, are more likely to support laws and regulations that prevent this type of situation from occurring.
The third psychological mechanism, biased assimilation, refers to the tendency of individuals to condition their acceptance of new information as reliable based on its conformity to their prior beliefs.
42
Rather than accommodating their current beliefs to new contrary information, studies suggest that people will instead discount new information if it is inconsistent with their prior views. 43 This phenomenon makes sense considering most people do not have sufficient information of their own to decide whether to believe or disbelieve new information. Especially where new information challenges a belief that is central to a person's cultural identity, the push-back against new contrary information may be significant. So, for instance, new evidence that unions help make workplaces more profitable will be disbelieved by an antiunion employer, while similar proof that raising the minimum wage causes unemployment will be disregarded by proemployee types.
Finally, the phenomenon of group polarization explains how cultural worldviews condition an individual's beliefs about societal harms through a set of in/out-group dynamics. Again, because of a includes firing union supporters, threatening to shut down the workplace even when such claims are unfounded, and bribing workers into voting against the union.").
38. Levit 
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lack of original information of their own, individuals tend to rely on those whom they trust to tell them which risk claims are serious and which are specious. 44 So while conservatives flock to Limbaugh and Fox News, liberals find solace in Maddow and MSNBC. Democrats believe President Obama's campaign pledges, while Republicans disbelieve him and even call him a "liar." 45 In fact, this state of affairs is hardly surprising given that "[s]tates of persistent group polarization are . . . inevitable-almost mathematically so-as beliefs feed on themselves within cultural groups, whose members stubbornly dismiss as unworthy insights originating outside the group." 46 In all, these social psychological mechanisms aid in describing how values work to change factual perceptions and behavior. Further, the melding of Douglas' anthropological worldviews with these mechanisms provides the powerful story of cultural cognition: how a person's values subconsciously influence how he or she perceives the world and the risks within it.
B. Cultural Cognition Theory and the Law
As explained in the prior section, culture cognition theory provides a linkage between a person's cultural worldview and how he or she interprets social harms. The observation that diverse cultural groups perceive risk through various cognitive lenses could have practical applications in numerous fields of study, but such discernment certainly has potential value in the legal arena. This is hardly surprising given that law concerns itself with the regulation and minimization of social harms. 47 In fact, cultural cognition theory provides insight into both the enactment of legislation and judicial decisionmaking. For instance, although citizens of a country might agree that laws should generally increase society's material well-being, much disagreement exists over which laws will lead to that desired result. 48 Individuals disagree fiercely about which laws will achieve their desired ends as an empirical matter. Two people with different cultural worldviews might 44 agree that they want a safer and more secure society within which to live but will disagree about whether more or less nuclear power will achieve that desired result. 49 In fact, these factual disagreements among individuals from different cultural worldviews have been empirically shown to best explain patterns in how people disagree about hot-button legal and political issues.
50
A case in point is an empirical study completed by Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman on a recent Supreme Court case involving the alleged excessive use of force by police officers in a high-speed car chase. 51 In Scott v. Harris, 52 police officers conducted a harrowing chase of a suspect's car through busy roads with other cars and pedestrians present. 53 The chase ended with one of the police cars intentionally bumping the suspect's car, causing it to roll over at high speed and rendering the suspect a quadriplegic. 54 The suspect then sued the police department under federal civil rights law alleging that the use of deadly force to terminate the chase constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
55
What makes the case unique is that the whole car chase was captured on two different police cars' video cameras, and the combined video was submitted as evidence on behalf of the police to establish that their conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. 56 Agreeing with the police, Justice Scalia, for eight members of the Court, ifferent groups respond to the suggestion that a reinvigorated nuclear energy program is needed to respond to global warming. For those opposed to nuclear energy, the juxtaposition of the two issues seems absurd; but to those in favor of the technology the linkage is obvious."); see also Lin, supra note 44, at 1138-39 ("[R]ecognizing the role of values has critical implications for practical strategies for changing individual conduct, for the content of [the] laws to address climate change, and for presenting and justifying proposed laws and policies to the public.").
50. 
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CULTURAL COGNITION AT WORK 119 found that with the video as the primary evidence, it was impossible to disagree that the police acted in a reasonable manner. 58 In a footnote, Justice Scalia further stated, "We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself." 59 Justice Scalia's conclusion that only one interpretation was possible after viewing the video, however, was rendered suspect by Justice Stevens' dissent. Justice Stevens stated that after watching the video of the high speed chase he did not necessarily believe that the police acted in a reasonable manner. 60 Rather, he mentioned that growing up in a different age and time made the swerving between lanes on a two-lane highway of the suspect's car seem less harrowing than it might have seemed to others. 61 He also noted the suspect had not done anything wrong at that point of the chase besides flee from the police.
62
In all, Justice Stevens challenged the majority's interpretation of the videotape and found that the case should be submitted to a jury because reasonable fact finders could disagree over whether the police used excessive force against the suspect in these circumstances. 63 58. Id. at 381 ("Judging the matter on that basis, we think it is quite clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment."); see also id. at 383-84 ("Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is clear from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.").
59. Id. at 378 n.5. 60. Id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Rather than supporting the conclusion that what we see on the video 'resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort,' . . . the tape actually confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower courts' appraisal of the factual questions at issue.").
61. Id. at 390 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Had they learned to drive when most highspeed driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on superhighways-when split-second judgments about the risk of passing a slow-poke in the face of oncoming traffic were routinethey might well have reacted to the videotape more dispassionately."). The Eleventh Circuit similarly found, "[T]aking the facts from the non-movant's viewpoint, [respondent] remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He did not run any motorists off the road. . . . Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in the shopping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian and vehicular traffic as the center was closed. Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the highway and Scott rammed [respondent], the motorway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police blockades of the nearby intersections." Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 815-16 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
62. Harris, 550 U.S. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I recognize, of course, that even though respondent's original speeding violation on a four-lane highway was rather ordinary, his refusal to stop and subsequent flight was a serious offense that merited severe punishment. It was not, however, a capital offense, or even an offense that justified the use of deadly force rather than an abandonment of the chase.").
63. Id. at 391 ("A jury could certainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to no greater risk than persons who take the same action in response to a speeding ambulance, and that their reactions were fully consistent with the evidence that respondent, though speeding, retained full control of his vehicle."); see also id. at 395 ("Whether a person's actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force is a question of fact best reserved for a jury. Here, the Court has usurped the jury's factfinding function and, in doing so, implicitly labeled the four other judges to review the case unreasonable.").
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Based on the fact pattern of this case, Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald Braman set out to empirically determine whether Justice Scalia's challenge about the videotape could be met and whether cognitive illiberalism best explained the nature of the opinion. 64 Taking a diverse demographic sample of 1350 American citizens, which included hierarchs and communitarians as well as individualists and egalitarians, the authors showed the high-speed chase video from Scott v. Harris and asked them a number of questions. 65 Although most of the respondents agreed with Justice Scalia's interpretation of the video tape, 66 a surprising number of individuals, particularly from defined cultural subcommunities, agreed with Justice Steven's dissent that the video did not necessarily speak for itself.
67
More specifically, the authors found that "African Americans, lowincome workers . . . [and] Id. at 859-60. The authors also classified the different type of surveys individuals as either aleph or bet research subjects. Id. at 862. Aleph research subjects "morally disapprove of challenges to lawful authority and defiance of dominant norms," while bet subjects' "egalitarian worldviews and left-leaning political sensibilities can be expected to incline [them] to condemn authority figures for abuses of power much more readily than they condemn putative deviants for defying authority." Id. at 863-64.
66. Id. at 879 ("A very sizable majority of our diverse, nationally representative sample agreed with the Scott majority that Harris's driving exposed the public and the police to lethal risks, that Harris was more at fault than the police for putting the public in danger, and that deadly force ultimately was reasonable to terminate the chase.").
67. Id. at 841. 68. Id. 69. Id. at 879 ("Individuals who hold egalitarian and communitarian views, whose politics are liberal, who are well educated but likely less affluent, and whose ranks include disproportionately more African Americans and women, in contrast, were significantly more likely to form pro-plaintiff views and to reject the conclusion that the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to terminate the chase.").
70. Id. at 863; see also id. at 879 ("Individuals (particularly white males) who hold hierarchical and individualist cultural worldviews, who are politically conservative, who are affluent, and who reside in the West were likely to form significantly more prodefendant risk perceptions.").
71. Id. at 863.
Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman argue that Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in Scott constituted a "type of decisionmaking hubris that has cognitive origins and that has deleterious consequences that extend far beyond the Court's decision in Scott." 72 In these scenarios, the question becomes "whose eyes the law should believe when identifiable groups of citizens form competing factual perceptions." 73 See id. at 843 ("Judges, legislators, and ordinary citizens should therefore always be alert to the influence of this species of 'cognitive illiberalism' and take the precautions necessary to minimize it."). To be clear, in this Article, I do not seek to psychoanalyze the Justices or analyze the motives of any judge. It makes no sense to look at a particular individual and say that a particular perception on his or her part involves "cultural cognition," as the theory is best understood as a phenomenon of collective decisionmaking. Rather, this Article offers an account of how we, as observers of judges' decisions, make sense of what is going on in those decisions. Yet, to avoid awkwardness in exposition in the analysis below, the Article frequently talks about the Justices' reasoning as if we could see cultural cognition operating in judges' minds. (I am indebted to Dan Kahan for helping me to clarify my thoughts on this important point. Part, this Article considers the insights that cultural cognition theory can bring to courts deciding controversial types of labor and employment law disputes by analyzing two specific controversies-one in traditional labor law, the other in public employment law. In subsequent Parts, it then takes up the challenge of Kahan and his coauthors to spell out the precautions necessary to reduce the amount of cultural conflict in labor and employment law decisions. It does this by considering potential social science and legal techniques for ridding legal decisions of delegitimizing bias and simultaneously making them more acceptable to a larger segment of society.
III. CULTURAL COGNITION IN ACTION: LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW CASE STUDIES
Whereas the empirical study of reactions to the chase videotape in Scott v. Harris focused on the cultural biases of individuals, this Paper focuses on the role these biases may play in fashioning judicial decisions in closely contested labor and employment law cases. 78 This shift of emphasis aids in considering how cultural attitudes of judges may provide a method for understanding larger policy debates among citizens in society. 79 Consequently, the specific cultural debates being played out in the courtrooms of this country become magnified when that judges' gender mattered to case outcomes. Though plaintiffs lost in the vast majority of cases, they were twice as likely to prevail when a female judge was on the bench.").
78. See Kahan, supra note 12, at 421 (arguing that if cultural cognition operates when ordinary people make sense of ambiguous facts, then "it's plausible that it's what happens with judges when they have to do so in cases"); see also Rachlinski et al., supra note 77.
79. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 167 ("For many citizens, men and women in white lab coats speak with less authority than (mostly) men and women in black frocks."). 83 reasoned that the antiunion bias of striker replacements 84 could not be presumed and that this determination had to be made on a case-bycase basis. 85 The specific facts of the case established that the employer unilaterally withdrew recognition after hiring twenty-nine permanent replacement employees to replace twenty-two strikers. 86 Subsequently, the employer refused to bargain with the incumbent union maintaining that it had the necessary doubt that the union no longer had the support of the majority of workers in the bargaining unit. 87 The Court held that the National Labor Relations Board 85. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 793 ("Even if replacements often do not support the union . . . , it was not irrational for the Board to conclude that the probability of replacement opposition to the union is insufficient to justify an antiunion presumption."). In teaching this case in labor law class, I sometimes point to the so-called "Billy Elliott" scenario in which onetime strikers cross picket lines and become "scabs" to provide for their families' needs (and even tuition for a son's dance class (NLRB or Board) had acted appropriately within its discretion to not adopt the replacement worker antiunion presumption. 88 The presence or absence of this presumption was critical in determining whether the company could unilaterally withdraw recognition from the incumbent union consistent with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
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Under the NLRA at the time, a company could only withdraw recognition if it had "good faith doubt" based on "objective considerations"
90 that a majority of workers no longer supported the union. 91 If the replacement workers could be placed on the antiunion side of the ledger, a company could conceivably provoke a strike, hire enough replacement workers so that the union would no longer enjoy majority support, 92 and then have a group of antiunion employees file a decertification petition to rid itself of the union, making the statutory right to strike illusory. 93 One of the dissents, written by Justice Scalia, focused on the inevitable antagonism between strikers and replacement workers and concluded that it was lawful for an employer to withdraw recognition based on its reasonable doubt that the union still had majority support with these replacement workers in place.
94
To better understand the manner in which Justice Marshall for the majority and Justice Scalia in his dissent were disagreeing over twenty-four workers for the union and twenty-five against. There was some debate whether the five who crossed the picket line could be presumed to be antiunion. Id. at 782-83.
88. Id. at 788 ("We find the Board's no-presumption approach rational as an empirical matter."). 92. The NLRA requires that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining [be appointed] by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). The importance of this majoritarian principle becomes clearer when one considers that a union so designated is deemed the "exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit . . . ." Id.
93. The statutory right to strike is found in Section 13 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C § 163 ("Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.").
94. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 801-02 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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legally consequential facts in this area of labor law, it is first necessary to review the withdrawal of recognition labor law doctrine.
Employer Withdrawal of Union Recognition Generally
This debate surrounding whether striker replacements must be presumed to be antiunion in their outlook, takes place in the larger context of deciding when an employer may unilaterally withdrawal recognition from a union that currently represents a unit of the company's employees. Unions are entitled to an irrebuttable presumption of majority support for one year after being certified by the NLRB ("certification bar"), 95 one year after a representation election ("election bar"), 96 and up to three years after the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement ("contract bar"). 97 If the employer refuses to bargain with the union during that time, it is a per se unfair labor practice (ULP) under Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 98 Thereafter, the presumption becomes a rebuttable one, and a unionized employer has a number of ways to establish that the incumbent union no longer enjoys majority support. 99 On the one hand, a group of antiunion employees can file a Recognition Method (RM) petition seeking to decertify the union through a formal, Boardsupervised election. 100 On the other hand, the employer can attempt to unilaterally withdraw recognition and cease to recognize and bargain with the union as the bargaining representative of its employees based on good faith doubt. 101 Not surprisingly, because of the uncertainties that come with any secret ballot election, employers historically used the unilateral withdrawal route and much controversy has 
Withdrawal of Union Recognition in Striker Replacement Scenario
Curtin Matheson concerned the latter way of proving that the union no longer enjoyed majority status among the employees it represented-by showing it had a "good-faith doubt" based on "objective considerations." The objective considerations needed to form the good faith doubt in Curtin Matheson involved the employer's belief that striker replacements who crossed the picket line to take striking workers' jobs could be reasonably presumed not to support the union.
103
In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall noted that new employees who are hired in nonstrike situations are presumed to support the incumbent union "in the same proportion as the employees they replace." 104 On the other hand, the law has been inconsistent in evaluating the views of replacement workers who were hired in strike situations.
105 By 1987, however, the Board, in the Station KKHI case, had come to conclude that no universal generalizations could be made about whether striker replacements supported or opposed the union and settled on a "no presumption" rule in these cases.
106
The Board maintained "that the pro-union presumption lacked empirical foundation because 'incumbent unions and strikers some- 
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times have shown hostility toward the permanent replacements,' and 'replacements are typically aware of the union's primary concern for the striker's welfare, rather than that of the replacements.' " 107 Equally, however, the antiunion presumption was unsupportable factually because striker replacements may just not approve of the specific strike or face financial problems, even though they would normally support the union. 108 Finally, the Court noted the Board's reluctance, due to policy reasons, to adopt a presumption that would further undermine the employees' right to strike. 109 In the end, then, the Board decided to adopt a no-presumption rule and require independent evidence on a case-by-case basis of replacement workers' sentiments toward the union.
110
After reviewing current Board law, the Court began its analysis by restating the initial rebuttable presumption that employees support the union in these cases. 111 The burden is then on the employer to rebut the presumption of majority union support through good faith doubt based on objective considerations. 112 Critically, then, Justice Marshall in the majority decision rejects the employer's argument that the Board must adopt "a second, subsidiary presumptionthat replacement employees oppose the union."
113 Such an approach would be inconsistent with the requirement that the good faith doubt of the employer in unilaterally withdrawing recognition from the union be based on objective considerations-under the antiunion presumption "the employer would not need to offer any objective evidence of the employees' union sentiments to rebut the presumption of the union's continuing majority status."
114 Therefore, the majority decision concludes that the Board's refusal to adopt the antiunion presumption was rational and consistent with the NLRA. 115 Because such evidence of antiunion orientation among the replacement workers was lacking, 116 the Court affirmed the Board's decision-that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice when it had withdrawn recognition from the union. 
Curtin Matheson Through the Prism of Cultural Cognition Theory
Recall now that cultural cognition theory teaches that judges' values play a subconscious role in the way that they interpret facts.
118
Curtin Matheson is all about facts; as Justice Marshall points out: "We find the Board's no-presumption approach rational as an empirical matter." 119 In this sense, Justice Marshall appears to be privileging one view concerning whether strike replacements generally have an antiunion or prounion view in the replacement worker context. Note, however, that Marshall's decision does not amount to the same "decisionmaking hubris" that Justice Scalia was guilty of in the Scott v. Harris decision, 120 and it instead recognizes that there are different ways to interpret the facts in a case such as this one. Note also that Justice Marshall must engage in an evaluation of the facts from a particular cultural standpoint because, short of taking an unlikely survey of replacement workers who cross picket lines, it is impossible to know for sure their prounion or antiunion orientation.
121
Justice Scalia, for his part, does not appear to view his reading of the facts as merely one possible interpretation. Like his opinion in Scott v. Harris, he writes from the vantage point that "no reasonable person" could possibly disagree with the proposition that good-faith doubt of continuing union majority status could be based on replacement workers holding antiunion views. 122 Justice Scalia claims that a necessary and eternal conflict exists between union members and replacement workers as a result of unions seeking to have replacement workers discharged when the strike is over. 123 To Justice Sca-118. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 167 ("[C]ultural cognition operates as an information-processing filter.").
119. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 788. 120. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 842. 121. Interestingly, from the Board standpoint, the good-faith doubt standard was never supposed to be a search for the subjective sentiments of replacements, but a rule that employers should not be able to rid themselves of unions merely by hiring replacements workers. See Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1344 (1987). Yet, in the hands of the Supreme Court, the subjective sentiments of replacement workers are clearly central to the Justices' disagreement.
122. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 801 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Since the principal employment-related interest of strike replacements (to retain their jobs) is almost invariably opposed to the principal interest of the striking union (to replace them with its striking members) it seems to me impossible to conclude on this record that the employer did not have a reasonable, good-faith doubt regarding the union's majority status.").
123. Id. A further point in support of this general proposition is the use of the derogatory term "scab" to refer to those who cross the picket line. Here are the famous words of the union adherent, Jack London, on the worth of "scabs":
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, he had some awful substance left with which he made a scab. A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and glue. Jack London, The Scab (1902).
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CULTURAL COGNITION AT WORK 129 lia, it therefore makes "plain" sense to presume replacement workers have an antiunion outlook. Yet, such an analysis unnecessarily alienates cultural subcommunities and delegitimizes the law for a segment of society. 124 Like in Scott v. Harris, Justice Scalia simply does not consider that there might be cultural subcommunities that disagree with his assessment of the pertinent facts because of their different cultural commitments. 125 And perhaps Justice Scalia's argumentative approach in his dissent in Curtin Matheson is really not all that surprising because cultural cognition theory teaches that judges gravitate toward factual beliefs that are most congenial to their existing values-this is cognitive illiberalism.
126 Especially in this type of labor law case where there is necessarily speculation about what motivates the replacement worker to cross the picket line (and the evidence must remain somewhat inconclusive), judges become motivated, understandably, to find conduct they see as praiseworthy as also socially beneficial.
127
Although it is not possible to say what thoughts crossed Justice Scalia's mind when he wrote his dissent in Curtin Matheson, its assertions certainly would seem to appeal to individuals with individualistic and hierarchical conceptions of the world. Under this view, individual replacement workers are praiseworthy in working to secure jobs that they would otherwise not have if the union were in complete control of the situation. Moreover, it is good that employers be able to exercise their managerial prerogative to unilaterally withdraw recognition from the union as long as they establish the relatively low standard of good faith doubt since employers, after all, 124 . Consider the heated language Justice Scalia employs in disagreeing with the majority opinion: "Also embarrassingly wide of the mark is the Court's observation that '[u]nions do not inevitably demand displacement of all strike replacements.' " Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 808 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 812 ("I reiterate that the burden upon the employer here was not to demonstrate 100% assurance that a majority of the bargaining unit did not support the union, but merely 'reasonable doubt' that they did so. It seems to me absurd to deny that it sustained that burden."). Justice Scalia could have made both of these points without disparaging his opponent's argument. By choosing otherwise, he unnecessarily delegitimizes the cultural subgroups who agree with Justice Marshall's version of the facts. See infra Part V (discussing methods for counteracting cognitive illiberalism in judges).
125. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 805 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The precise question presented is whether there was substantial evidence to support this factual finding. There plainly was not.").
126. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 151 (maintaining under cultural cognition theory that people's views of conduct "will inevitably be guided by their cultural evaluations of these activities").
127. This psychological orientation of individuals can be called "naïve realism" or "cognitive illiberalism." Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 843, 895. It is the "overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of the factual perceptions we hold in common with our confederates and unwarranted contempt for the perceptions associated with our opposites." Id. at 843.
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should be deferred to in the workplace. 128 By benefiting employers in this manner in the labor law context, the opinion is filled with hierarchical ideas about how a workplace should be run. The opinion appears antagonistic to any outcome that would support the continuance of union representation, since unions undermine the right of employers to run their businesses as they deem best and bring unnecessary regulation to the company. Now, all of this is not to imply that Justice Marshall's majority opinion is a paragon of how a culturally aware opinion should be written by a judge in a labor and employment law case. Yet, Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Curtin Matheson more closely approaches an understanding that there actually can be disagreement about the empirical reality of the replacement worker situation. By discounting both the prounion presumption and antiunion presumption in favor of a no-presumption rule, his opinion indicates an understanding that different cultural communities might view the relevant facts differently.
129 Nevertheless, his majority decision is very much written for individuals with egalitarian and communitarian commitments when he sees the reality of the situation in a way that allows unions to continue to effectively strike (and he expressly condones that policy goal), 130 while at the same time allowing unions to keep their privileged, exclusive representative status in the workplace.
In short, the manner in which legally-consequential facts are interpreted in Curtin Matheson is consistent with Justices Marshall and Scalia's prior cultural commitments. In this sense, culture is indeed prior to facts as culture cognition theory suggests. 129. Particularly note the use by Justice Marshall of words like "may," "in some circumstances," and "otherwise," to indicate his understanding that different groups may understand the motives of replacement workers differently. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 789 ("Although replacements often may not favor the incumbent union, the Board reasonably concluded, in light of its long experience in addressing these issues, that replacements may in some circumstances desire union representation despite their willingness to cross the picket line. Economic concerns, for instance, may force a replacement employee to work for a struck employer even though he otherwise supports the union and wants the benefits of union representation.").
B. Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture
130. Id. at 794 ("The Board's approach to determining the union views of strike replacements is directed at this same goal because it limits employers' ability to oust a union without adducing any evidence of the employees' union sentiments and encourages negotiated solutions to strikes.").
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131 ture 131 involves a constitutional interpretation of the equal protection doctrine in the public employment law context. In another closely divided Supreme Court case, the Court held in Engquist that a "classof-one" equal protection claim does not exist for public employees.
132
The facts of the case were fairly straightforward and common: a personality dispute existed between a worker and new supervisor, who replaced an agreeable old supervisor, in a public-sector workplace.
133
In addition to other constitutional and statutory claims, the employee sued her state employer under the Equal Protection Clause, arguing that her termination was for " 'arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons.' " 134 Put differently, even under rational basis review, the employee alleged that the State's adverse employment actions were without any rational basis and solely for arbitrary reasons and thus, violated the Equal Protection Clause. 135 The jury agreed with the employee on this class-of-one equal protection claim and she was awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages.
136
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, overturned the jury's verdict, finding that public employees cannot bring such classof-one claims. 137 He reasoned that the class-of-one theory was simply a "poor fit" for public employment and public employees only had equal protection claims if class-based discrimination existed. 138 He also based his holding on the need for greater latitude for the government in its employment role to maintain control and discipline in the workplace. 139 The dissent by Justice Stevens maintained, however, that no compelling reasons existed for not applying the usual rational basis review to employment actions by the government. 
The History of the "Class-of-One" Equal Protection Doctrine
For those most familiar with reading about equal protection cases involving heightened judicial scrutiny because of a suspect classifica-131. 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008). The six-to-three decision produced two opinions, including the majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Kennedy, and Breyer) and a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Ginsberg and Souter).
132. Id. at 2148-49 ("We hold that such a 'class-of-one' theory of equal protection has no place in the public employment context.").
133. 143 the Supreme Court found a class-ofone equal protection violation when there was an intentional undervaluation by state officials of property in the same class as other property that was properly valued. 144 The Court found that this state action contravened the equal protection rights of the company taxed on the full value of its property. 145 Some seven decades later, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Commission of Webster County,
146 the Court considered the class-ofone theory in a similar scenario involving a taxing scheme. There, landowners challenged the valuation placed on their property by the county tax assessor. 147 The Court held that the County could not assess the plaintiffs' property "at 50% of what is roughly its current value, [when] neighboring comparable property which has not been recently sold is assessed at only a minor fraction of that figure." 148 Consequently, the Court held that the taxing scheme of the County violated the Equal Protection Clause.
149
In a more recent case involving government regulatory action, the Court also applied this class-of-one theory of equal protection. In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 150 the Court recognized a class-of-one equal protection claim in a situation in which a property owner sued his Village when he was required to have an easement eighteen feet longer than was required of other citizens to connect his property to a municipal water supply. 151 Although Olech, like the other two previous cases, did not involve a claim of class-based discrimination, the Court nevertheless recognized that the Equal Protection Clause also 
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protects against government action which "irrationally singled out as a so-called 'class of one.' " 152 In short, the Court in Olech permitted an Equal Protection Clause claim where an allegation had been made that the government had intentionally treated someone different than others and there was no rational basis for the disparate treatment. 
Public Employment and the "Class-of-One" Doctrine
In Engquist, the employee had argued that the class-of-one theory should also apply to public employment. She argued:
[1]the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals, not classes; [2] that the Clause proscribes "discrimination arising not only from a legislative act but also from the conduct of an administrative official,"; and [3] that the Constitution applies to the State not only when it acts as regulator, but also when it acts as employer. 154 Consequently, she argued: "differential treatment of government employees-even when not based on membership in a class or groupviolates the Equal Protection Clause unless supported by a rational basis."
155
Although Chief Justice Roberts agreed with all three of the employee's legal premises, he nevertheless held against her based on his views concerning the empirical reality of public workplaces. 156 First, he sought to distinguish the previous class-of-one equal protection claims. Using the phraseology "[w]hat seems to have been significant in Olech," he reasoned that the previous cases were about "the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed."
157 On the other hand, the government employer was exercising discretionary authority based on subjective, individualized determinations. 158 Because the other cases involved instances of differential treatment which raised concerns of arbitrary classification, but the current case did not, those other cases could not be read to require a class-of-one theory in the public employment context. 159 Equal protection in this context is just a "poor Chief Justice Roberts next calls upon a line of precedent for support that government acting as employer has much more latitude to act against employees than the government as sovereign when it interacts with citizens. 162 Yet, although legally speaking this reading of past precedent is accurate, 163 the Court had never made the leap to previously hold that; therefore, the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to individual public employees when government takes arbitrary administrative action against them. 164 To make that leap, Chief Justice Roberts relies upon "unique considerations" involving the ability of public employers to run their workplaces as they see fit. 165 Calling on similar language from cases involving public employment and the First Amendment free speech context, he argues that courts would be overwhelmed if every government personnel decision could be challenged under the Equal Protection 
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Clause. 166 He raises the specter of a litigation apocalypse 167 without pointing to any statistics or other evidence that in fact there has been a problem previously with these types of cases flooding the courts. 168 In the name of managerial prerogative, 169 he denies some twenty million public employees the protection of rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. 170 This astounding act, supported by five other Justices, derives from Chief Justice Roberts' " 'common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.' " 171 In other words, he takes for granted that such class-of-one claims could not factually coexist with an effectively-run, public workplace.
Last, Chief Justice Roberts argues for the need to protect public at-will employment. This is also a factual error because the vast majority of public employees are not employed at will. Forty percent of them are unionized under a just-cause standard and most of the rest are under state or federal civil service protections which also trump the common-law standard.
172 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts argues that permitting rational basis review under a class-of-one equal protection theory would conflict with this at-will principle. 168. Id. at 2157 ("The practical problem with allowing class-of-one claims to go forward in this context is not that it will be too easy for plaintiffs to prevail, but that governments will be forced to defend a multitude of such claims in the first place, and courts will be obliged to sort through them in a search for the proverbial needle in a haystack."). 2006)) ("To be sure, Congress and all the States have, for the most part, replaced at-will employment with various statutory schemes protecting public employees from discharge for impermissible reasons."). He nevertheless concludes that "a government's decision to limit the ability of public employers to fire at will is an act of legislative grace, not constitutional mandate." Id. And there is "only one Equal Protection Clause," Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring), and that clause clearly does not distinguish between government actions taken against individuals versus groups.
173. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156 ("[R]ecognition of a class-of-one theory of equal protection in the public employment context-that is, a claim that the State treated an em-Justice Stevens, writing in dissent for himself and two others, appears to divine Chief Justice Roberts' and his cohorts' motivations. Justice Stevens also has a very different view of the empirical reality of the public workplace. Seeing the majority decision as being part of the same line of reasoning as that found in the Garcetti free speech context, he calls out the majority for "carrv[ing out] a novel exception out of state employees' constitutional rights." 174 More specifically, and relying on numerous passages from Olech, he observes, "Unless state action that intentionally singles out an individual, or a class of individuals, for adverse treatment is supported by some rational justification, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment's command that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' " 175 He therefore takes issue with the majority's idea that public employment decisions are somehow special in being inherently discretionary and therefore, a poor fit for class-of-one treatment. 176 He points out that the zoning decision at issue in Olech was similarly discretionary and yet, the Court applied the class-ofone theory there. 177 Stevens also points out that although employment at will was the wide-spread practice in the 1890s, it has not been so at least since the 1960s. 178 Yet, even in the midst of all of these legal arguments, it appears that Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion is really about contesting the empirical reality of the majority's decision. His dissenting opinion contends that the subtext of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion is that public agencies will not be able to operate efficiently if they have to defend all of these equal protection lawsuits. 179 He points out that there have been exceedingly few class-of-one equal protection lawsuits hitherto and no evidence exists that any federal, state, or local agency, anywhere in the country, has become overrun by such lawployee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all-is simply contrary to the concept of at-will employment. The Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine.").
174. )) ("In the 1890's that doctrine applied broadly to government employment, but for many years now 'the theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.' ").
179. Id. ("Presumably the concern that actually motivates today's decision is fear that governments will be forced to defend against a multitude of 'class of one' claims unless the Court wields its meat-axe forthwith.").
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181 Justice Stevens therefore concluded that, "[e]ven if some surgery were truly necessary to prevent governments from being forced to defend a multitude of equal protection 'class of one' claims, the Court should use a scalpel rather than a meat-axe." 
Engquist Through the Prism of Cultural Cognition Theory
Based on the above analysis in Engquist, it would not be surprising for a reader to take the following lesson from the case: irrespective of the actual facts of the case, Chief Justice Roberts and his conservative allies will rule for employers in most cases and Justice Stevens and his liberal allies will rule similarly for employees. 183 Yet, I argue that although there might be some truth to these assertions, it is more valuable to apply cultural cognition theory to the decision in Engquist because this theory helps to explain the mechanism by which the majority and dissenting Justices bring their values to bear on legally consequential facts in the case.
The factual dispute in Engquist, as I have argued above, is over the empirical situation that public employers would face as a result of recognizing a class-of-one equal protection theory claim. Chief Justice Roberts maintains that such claims will eventually interfere with the ability of government employers to run an efficient workplace.
184
Using cultural cognition theory, it is possible to see how Chief Justice Roberts' opinion would appeal to those with cultural beliefs with a focus on hierarchical values whose concerns would include whether appropriate government authorities would be able to control this type of litigation from spinning out of control. Throughout the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts also mentions the special needs of the 180. Id. 181. Id. at 2160-61 ("Experience demonstrates, however, that these claims are brought infrequently, that the vast majority of such claims are asserted in complaints advancing other claims as well, and that all but a handful are dismissed well in advance of trial."). On the other hand, Justice Stevens' dissent in Engquist appeals to individuals with a cultural commitment to egalitarian values. 186 His opinion prizes the ability of any individual, whether in government employment or not, to call upon the protections of the Equal Protection Clause if the government acts towards them in an arbitrary and irrational manner. To those who agree with Justice Stevens, it would appear more important that public employees are treated equally by their employers than whether there is some distant potential for future litigation that might disrupt the workplace. Justice Stevens also appears to try to dispel the fears of the individualists and hierarchs by proving that at least the present experience suggests that such floods of litigation are unlikely to happen. But notice that it is because there is necessarily speculation and inconclusive evidence concerning whether such litigation will actually ensue that the cultural commitments of the various Justices come to play a more prominent role in how they view these legally consequential facts. Even though we have some evidence from the lower appellate courts that such claims are rather unusual in public employment, the evidence still remains inconclusive. As a result, the Justices fall back on their cultural commitments to decide these disputed factual questions.
In each opinion in Engquist, then, the cultural worldview indicates how Justices will come to evaluate disputed factual claims embedded in what they agree is the controlling legal standard. Both sides in each of these opinions are sincerely basing their decisions on their views of the law, but as Kahan explains, "what they understood the law to require was nevertheless shaped by their values-operating not as resources for theorizing law, but as subconscious, extralegal influences on their perception of legally consequential facts." 187 185. See also Kahan, supra note 12, at 418 (discussing similar concerns in environmental law case).
186. Interestingly enough, Justice Stevens does not appear to rely on communitarian values in the same way that Justice Marshall does in Curtin Matheson. Had he done so, he might have pointed out that the loss of this equal protection claim for public employees has dire consequences for the community at large. See infra Part V.A.
187. Kahan, supra note 12, at 417.
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IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CULTURAL COGNITION INSIGHT
Because of its ability to shed light on the mechanism by which values shape judicial opinions, cultural cognition theory is vital to future attempts to tamp down cultural judicial biases that invariably lead to conflicted legal decisions. As argued above, the recognition of cultural cognition as an explanatory device for why judges act the way they do in these cases is especially helpful in labor and employment decisions. This is because many of these judicial decisions appear to be based on a large amount of speculation and inconclusive evidence about: employer and employee motivations (in the labor, employment discrimination, and employee benefit contexts); the proper measure for efficiency in both the public and private workplace; and the proper standard of technical measurements (like technological feasibility in the OSHA context). 188 In these circumstances, this Article maintains that prior cultural commitments of the judge do a better job explaining how they will rule in these disputes than any other type of ideology-based analyses. Knowing the mechanism by which judicial values foment controversy in labor and employment decisions is important for two related reasons. First, if we see judges as acting self-consciously on partisan or legal motives to find for the employer versus the employee, the whole judicial enterprise is likely to lack legitimacy for a broad segment of society.
190 As Kahan explains, "the cultural cognition thesis, if true, [would] spare us from the disappointment associated with believing that judicial disagreement stems from self-conscious, and selfconsciously concealed, political disregard for law." 191 When it comes to issues of justice, individuals want to see that there are certain minimum conditions of legal process being met.
192
One of those essential conditions is an independent, neutral, and unbiased adjudicator. 193 Now, it might be impossible to rid judicial deci-188. Id. at 419 (discussing case where cultural cognition provided important insights where the factual issues that divided the judges involved considerable uncertainty and inconclusive evidence); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
189. Accord Posner, supra note 7, at 1060 ("At bottom, . . . the sources of ideology are both cognitive and psychological, but I think the psychological dominates, because psychology exerts such a great influence on our interpretation of our experiences, including the weights assigned to the possible consequences of deciding a case one way or the other.").
190. Kahan Scalia consider that individuals come with different circumstances to a picket line. At the very least, this approach might have helped him to tone down his rhetoric and write his opinion in a manner that would appeal in different ways to both management and union-types. So, rather than focusing on the inevitable antagonism between replacement workers and strikers, Justices Scalia might have agreed on emphasizing the need for a consistent standard that takes into account the different reasons why workers cross picket lines, emphasizing the need for uniformity in this area of the law, or focused on the advantages of a political rather than judicial regulation of these strikebreaking regulations. In any event, Justice Scalia's highly charged language about the relationship between strikers and replacement workers needlessly burdens the law with cultural partisanship, detracting from its legitimacy. 206 Justice Marshall could also have chosen a different route in argumentation in support of the no presumption rule in Curtin Matheson. Rather than focusing on what the motivations of replacement workers might have been, he could have just embraced an approach that focused on the policy decision of the NLRB, which already contained indicia of appropriate judicial habits of mind. Indeed, he spends a significant amount of time pointing out that the Court normally defers to interpretations of the Board that are rational and consistent with the NLRA. 207 Perhaps, rather than focusing on the subjective sentiments of replacement workers, the Court could have just "emphasized . . . that the NLRB has the primary responsibility for developing and applying national labor policy,"
208 that "a Board rule is entitled to deference even if it represents a departure from the Board's prior policy," 209 and concluded that because no one knows with certainty whether individual replacement workers support or do not support a union, the Board's approach was one of a number of reasonable ones. 210 This judicial approach would offer the advantage of not having the Justices engage in a cultural debate over the relevant empirical facts about striker replacement workers' motivations. In a word, it would have been a decision full of judicial humility.
In the Engquist decision, Chief Justice Roberts could have exercised more humility by not just considering the desires of public employers to have wide latitude to run their workplaces, but also the concerns of a discernible group of public employees and the citizenry at large who depend on these workers to keep government transparent and accountable. Especially in a case like Engquist where the jury already rendered a verdict for the plaintiff based on equal protection concerns, 211 Roberts should have thought about what message his decision sent to the various cultural subgroups. Roberts would not have had to change how he ruled but rather could have changed how he talked about the facts in the way that he did rule. Exercising judicial humility in this way, Chief Justice Roberts could have avoided offending millions of public employees by saying, in effect, that they do not have the same equal protection rights as others who come under this foundational provision of the federal Constitution.
All this may feel and sound a little too wishy-washy for some, and one is certainly right to wonder whether this type of debiasing strategy will actually do much good in helping judges overcome their natural cultural biases. 212 As Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman point out in their discussion of the Scott v. Harris case, however, this exercise in judicial humility is helpful if for no other reason than it helps to guide courts away from unnecessary decisions that appear to embrace partisanship and delegitimize the concerns of a group of citizens who come out on the losing end in such cases. 213 Moreover, recent research on educating judges about their own biases has shown that "more precise techniques in encouraging selfanalysis" may be more successful than past debiasing strategies. 214 For instance, one such strategy that would require judges "to consider the opposite" might help them to overcome entrenched thinking that leads to culturally biased errors. 215 In other contexts, this strategy has proven effective, 216 and there is every reason to believe that
